




Th e rapid rise of the so-called Islamic Sta-
te, also known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), 
or by its Arabic abbreviation Da’esh stunned the 
world. In a short time period, ISIS conquered lar-
ge proportions of Iraq and Syria and established 
the fi rst caliphate in the modern Muslim world. 
It has created a blood-soaked proto-state charac-
terized by excessive brutality, violent jihad and 
strict interpretation of Islamic law. Its Salafi -jihadi 
doctrine based on theological puritanism and tra-
dition of the Prophet Muhammad aims towards 
depraving existing political systems in order to 
establish God’s rule on Earth. Its fanatical religio-
us zeal and indiscriminate violence has cost lives 
thousands of people from Iraq and Syria. But ISIS 
did not stop there. In just a few months aft er the 
establishment of the caliphate, ISIS made a stra-
tegic shift  and turned its weapons on the West. 
Regional violence soon turned into global jihad. 
War against the far enemy resulted with terrorist 
attacks in both Europe and North America. ISIS’s 
extremists and lone-wolf attackers have taken lives 
of hundreds of civilians and vowed to continue its 
global jihad until the end of the world.
Th is paper aims at providing an explanation 
why the Islamic State made a strategic shift  and 
started terrorist campaign against the West. Th e 
main thesis argues that an attack on Western co-
untries is a retaliatory strike for international mi-
litary intervention against the Islamic State. Th e 
Islamic State also believes it will play a key role in 
an impending apocalypse, and its terrorist activiti-
es against the West largely derive from that belief. 
In order to fi nd an answer to the research question, 
the research examines the context and the causes 
behind the Islamic State and what drives it to wage 
an asymmetric war on global scale. Th e study has 
focused on the analysis of religious terrorism as a 
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projection of violence aimed towards realization of 
political goals, ideological foundations of militant 
Islamism as a system of ideas and beliefs that foster 
violent activities, doctrine of the Islamic State as a 
codifi cation of its beliefs and activity, and ISIS’s glo-
bal terrorist campaign as a type of asymmetric war 
against Western countries. 
Th is study aims to expand upon previous rese-
arch by giving depth to understanding of ISIS’s ide-
ology, doctrine and indiscriminate violence toward 
both the near and far enemy. It is a qualitative type of 
study where both descriptive and analytical method 
are used. Th e research data used for this analysis 
comes largely from an extensive collection of mate-
rial and information extracted from various sources 
such as books, journals, reports, documents, and 
articles. Th e result of this research aims at providing 
a constructive framework for understanding ISIS’s 
terrorist threat.
2. TERRORISM AND RELIGION 
Modern religious terrorism surfaced around 
1980s. Since then, the most devastating and dead-
liest terrorist attacks were perpetrated by religious 
terrorist groups. Th e 1983 Beirut bombing attack on 
American and French peacekeepers and the 1992 
attack on Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires by Islamic 
Jihad, the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack by Aum 
Shinrikyo, the 1995 assassination of Israeli prime 
minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist, the 
1996 Jaff a Road bus bombings by Hamas and the 
1998 United States embassy bombings in Kenia and 
Tanzania by al-Qaeda, just to name a few, were all 
carried out by religiously inspired militants. Walter 
Laqueur notes that the real innovation in the late 
twentieth century is the appearance of radical reli-
gious (or quasi-religious) nationalist groups adop-
ting terrorism as their main form of struggle, some-
times within the framework of established religion 
(mainly Islam, but also Christianity, Judaism, and 
Hinduism), and sometimes in the form of millena-
rian sects [1]. Although the re-emergence of religio-
us motivations for terrorism over the last decades 
involved elements of all the world’s major religions 
and smaller cults and sects, the role of Islamic terro-
rism became predominant type of terrorism in the 
contemporary world. Th e 9/11 onslaught in the Uni-
ted States followed by the attacks in Madrid, London 
and other cities were a clear sign that Islamic terro-
rism will fi gure predominantly on the global agenda 
in the twenty-fi rst century.
Understanding of religious terrorism would be 
impossible without a comprehension of what terro-
rism really is. Writing about terrorism, Paul Wilkin-
son described the term as “systematic use of coerci-
ve intimidation, usually to serve political ends” [2]. 
Bruce Hoff man defi ned terrorism as “violence – or, 
equally important the threat of violence – used and 
directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim” 
[3]. For Jessica Stern terrorism is “an act or threat 
of violence against noncombatants with the objec-
tive of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise 
infl uencing an audience” [4]. Analysts from the Jo-
nathan Institute in Jerusalem in 1979 preferred a de-
fi nition which states that “terrorism is the deliberate 
and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of 
the innocent to inspire fear for political ends” [5]. 
In spite of eff orts by the most prominent experts on 
terrorism, there is no agreed defi nition for the term. 
Walter Laqueur thought that providing a compre-
hensive defi nition was virtually impossible because 
of the great variety of circumstances in which this 
type of violence had appeared and the numerous 
and oft en competing political causes whose advo-
cates had used it [6]. For the purpose of this paper, 
however, the working assumption is that terrorism is 
a deliberate violence or threat of violence against the 
innocent to inspire fear for achieving political ends.
While there is no agreed comprehension defi -
nition of terrorism, there is general understanding 
that terrorism is a political concept. Terrorism is 
always political, even when it also evinces other 
motives, such as the religious, the economic or the 
social [5]. Th is is critical in distinguishing terrorism 
from diff erent types of violence. In spite of political 
motives, terrorism is not a political movement or an 
ideology, but a tactic. Terrorism may be used on its 
own or as part of a wider unconventional war. It can 
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be employed by desperate and weak minorities, by 
states as a tool of domestic and foreign policy, or by 
belligerents as an accompaniment in all types and 
stages of warfare [2]. Terrorism is also a psycholo-
gical warfare. Th e primary psychological weapon of 
terrorism is fear. It aims at a target audience other 
than the actual victims of the act. Th e immediate 
victims are not as important as the broader message 
sent to the public [7]. Violence is not an end itself, 
but a mean to create fear in the minds of targeted 
public. Th e element of fear-indictment is crucial for 
terrorism. It is used to create and exploit a climate of 
fear among a wider target group that the immediate 
victims of the violence and to publicize a cause, as 
well as to coerce a target to acceding to the terrorists’ 
aims [2]. 
Th ere is no magic formula to explain why peo-
ple choose to be terrorists. Terrorism has been used 
to achieve political goals by many diff erent groups 
and individuals that it is virtually impossible to pro-
vide a profi le of the typical terrorist. Militant Islamist 
of today come from a wider demographic range, 
including university students, families with an im-
poverished background, highly educated professi-
onals, married men in their late forties, and rarely 
women. Marc Sageman studied the biographies of 
the 172 members of al-Qaeda and found that two-
thirds were middle or upper middle class and that 
60 percent had gone to college, several had docto-
rates. Th eir average age was twenty-six [8]. As for 
the radicals who join the so-called Islamic state, a 
2016 study from New America, a Washington-ba-
sed think tank, found that the average fi ghter at the 
time of joining ISIS was 26 to 27 years old, single, 
had travelled to less than two foreign counties, had 
the educational equivalent of a high school degree, 
had basic religious knowledge, reported no previous 
fi ghting experience, and had the professional equi-
valent of someone between an unskilled laborer and 
a blue-collar worker [9].
Th ose who are joining religious terrorist grou-
ps are extremists who abandoned rational thinking 
and try to pursue their own vision of the divine will. 
Th ey are motivated by what they identify as a reli-
gious mission. Th e practitioners of the new terrori-
sm believe themselves to be acting in the name of 
God. And it is to God that their deeds are directed, 
oft en in the hope that the violence will accelerate 
or radically transform the course of human history 
[10]. For for those who believe themselves themsel-
ves to be acting in the name of God and against his 
enemies violence is regarded as a divine command 
purpose or sacramental act. Religious terrorists also 
believe their religion is the only true and to protect it 
with life is a noble cause. Th eir religious fanaticism 
makes them extremely violent. If terrorists are reli-
gious believers, they might regard the slaughter as 
a commandment to destroy the infi del enemy once 
and for all [1]. For the religious terrorists, violence is 
fi rst and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty 
executed in direct response to some theological de-
mand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a tran-
scendental dimension, and its perpetrators therefore 
oft en disregard the political, moral, or practical con-
straints that may aff ect other terrorists [3]. 
One of the most disturbing features of religious 
terrorists is their eschatological presumptuousne-
ss about the world. Th e idea that life on earth will 
come to a violent end is central notion of terrorists 
who are preoccupied with the eschatology, apo-
calyptic concept referred as “the end of the world”. 
Th e believers in this apocalyptic perspective are con-
vinced that there is no salvation outside their ranks 
and that those who do not believe will be destroyed 
and suff er eternal damnation [1]. Th ose who do not 
share their religious convictions are targets of in-
discriminate violence. Terrorist groups who share 
apocalyptic concept of the world are most prone to 
develop the capability to mount catastrophic, mass 
casualty attacks, including the attacks using wea-
pons of mass destruction. 
3. THE ROOTS OF RADICAL ISLAM
Many Muslims today believe that the conditions 
of Islamic world require drastic reform of their so-
cieties. Th eir discontent derives from fragile archi-
tecture of the Islamic world. Th e governments of 
that world are corrupt, incompetent, and oppressi-
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ve. Services are atrocious, jobs are few, and hope for 
a better future is minimal. Most people who do get 
ahead do so by connections and servility. Widespre-
ad poverty and the failure of Arab governments to 
meet the basic needs of their peoples provided an 
opportunity for Islamic radicals to develop a stron-
ger popular base for support [2].
Th e most radical voice of the Muslim world is 
that of jihadists. Th e jihadists are a self-appointed 
collection of religious fanatics who have launched 
a holy war, a jihad, against the United States and 
everything American. Th ey have also declared war 
on Israel, Europe, anyone else who opposes the-
ir vision of a world governed by Islamic law [11]. 
Colloquially called jihadists, militant Islamists or 
Salafi sts, they are intent on establishing an Islamic 
state through violence. Th e term Salafi  simply me-
ans early Islamic, referring to those who lived in the 
fi rst centuries aft er Muhammad. In religious terms, 
it means opposition to reform and the purifi cation 
of Islam from alien elements [12]. 
Th e Jihadists of various colors and stripes want 
to purge the infi del and the deviant from Muslim so-
ciety and to construct a proper Islamic order under a 
restored caliphate modeled on the fi rst Islamic State 
established by Muhammad in the seventh century. 
Th e caliphate would be based on God’s injunctions 
set down in the basic texts of Islam, Quran and the 
Sunna (the words and deeds of the Prophet) whe-
re religion, politics and all other aspects of human 
life would be governed through sharia (Islamic law). 
In order to create a righteous Islamic order, the ji-
hadists need to replace existing political regimes in 
Muslim countries with a true Islamic society. Th ey 
believe that the only way to resurrect the caliphate 
is through a violent struggle, a jihad. Much as the 
Prophet Muhammed declared a jihad against the in-
fi dels from Mecca, so the jihadists believe it is their 
task to drive the infi dels from the lands of Islam [13]. 
Th ey see jihad as a requirement in a world divided 
between what they designate as dar al-Islam (house 
of Islam) and dar al-Harb (house of war). It is con-
sidered as permanent and universal religious obliga-
tion for all true Muslims to engage in a struggle to 
defend dar al-Islam and conquer dar al-Harb. 
One of the most prominent Islamic thinkers 
who distinguished sharply between dar al-Islam and 
dar al-Harb was a medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. 
He issued a fatwa that labeled the Mongols invaders 
as infi dels in spite of their conversion to Islam. Th e 
reason was their practice of mixing the creeds of se-
veral religions, failure to implement the Sariah and 
confl ict with the Mamluc Sultanate in Cairo. Hence, 
the Mongols become the lawful object of jihad. For 
him, jihad was “the best of the forms of voluntary 
service man can devote to God” [14]. Later genera-
tions, from Wahhabi movement to modern Egypt’s 
Sayyid Qutb, Islamic Jihad, the assassins of Anwar 
Sadat, and Osama bin Laden, would use the logic of 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa on the Mongols to call for a 
jihad against “un-Islamic” Muslim rulers and elites 
and against the West [15]. 
His teaching served as inspiration for Mu-
hammad ibn-Abdul Wahhab, a scholar and religio-
us leader who founded the Wahhabi movement is 
Saudi Arabia. He issued a fatwa that labeled all non-
Wahhabis as infi dels, proclaiming jihad even against 
the Ottoman Empire. Th e Wahhabis’ aim was to re-
place orthodox Islam with their puritanical doctri-
ne, which would become the state religion of Saudi 
Arabia [16]. Wahhabis reject the tradition that war 
is the lesser form of jihad, while purifi cation of the 
self is the greater form, a tradition widely accepted 
by mainstream clerics [17]. 
In the early twentieth century, the jihadist’s 
doctrine was further shaped by the radical teaching 
of an Egyptian imam Hasan al-Banna, founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and a Pakistani Islamic 
philosopher Mawlana Mawdudi, founder of Ja-
maat-e-Islami. Th eir organizations were designed to 
reestablish Islamic rule in the Muslim world. Both 
al-Banna and Mawdudi blamed westernized ruling 
elites and European imperialism for the misery of 
the Muslim world. Al-Banna rejected the preference 
for the spiritual jihad (greater jihad) over a military 
(lesser jihad) one. Since Muslim lands had been 
invaded, he said, it was incumbent on all Muslims 
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to repel their invaders just as it was an Islamic im-
perative for Muslims to oppose rulers who blocked 
the establishment of Islamic governments [15]. 
Mawdudi followed the same jihadi concept. For 
him, the fi ve traditional Pillars of Islam (profession 
of faith, prayer, the feast of Ramadan, pilgrimage, 
and almsgiving) were merely phases of training and 
preparation for jihad, the struggle against those of 
Allah’s creatures who had usurped his sovereignty. 
By the pen of Mawdudi, religion was turned into an 
ideology of political struggle [18]. 
Th eir teachings had a great eff ect on Sayyid 
Qutb, the most radical and most infl uential lea-
der and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. He 
sharply divided the world into two diametrically 
opposed camps and designated modern societies as 
un-Islamic and anti-Islamic. For Qutb, the West was 
the enemy par excellence of the Muslims, afraid of 
Islam and aware of its spiritual superiority. As Qutb 
saw it, there could never be peace with the West. 
Th e struggle was not about territory but about truth 
and which truth would prevail in the world [12]. 
For Qutb, jihad, as armed struggle in the defense of 
Islam against the injustice and oppression of anti-
Islamic governments and the neocolonialism of the 
West and the East (Soviet Union), was incumbent 
upon all Muslims. Th ere could be no middle ground 
[15]. He wrote that there is no defensive, limited war 
but only off ensive, total war that should be wedged 
upon domestic and foreign enemies who usurped 
God’s sovereignty. In jihadists’ eyes, Qutb appears 
bigger than life, a model to live up to and an example 
to be imitated [19].
Radical Islamist ideas were further strengthened 
by the writings of Muhammad al-Faraj, a member of 
the radical organization Islamic Jihad. Faraj believed 
that the decline of Muslim societies was made po-
ssible by those who had lulled the community into 
believing that jihad was nonviolent; the restoration 
of the Muslim world to the straight path of Islam 
hinged on reclaiming the true meaning of jihad, the 
forgotten or neglected requirement of Islam. Faraj 
maintained that jihad was the sixth pillar of Islam, 
forgotten or obscured by the majority of ulama and 
Muslims [15]. For Faraj, everything was subordina-
ted to jihad against the domestic tyrants, the “Pha-
raoh”, and the establishment of the rule of God. Faraj 
coined the terms “near enemy” and “far enemy” and 
assigned the highest priority to military confron-
ting the former. According to Faraj, everything else, 
including liberating occupied Jerusalem, took a back 
seat the fi ght against local apostates [19]. 
The importance of jihad against the far enemy 
was emphasized by Umar Abdel Rahman, a blind 
sheikh who was a spiritual leader of the violent Egyp-
tian group al Gamaa al Islamiyya and living guru for 
various groups of militant Islamists. He issued the 
fatwas they needed, be it for robbing and killing local 
goldsmiths (usually Christian) or for launching war 
against America, which, according to him, was the 
source of all evil and the main enemy of Islam, res-
ponsible for the unhappy condition of the Muslim 
world. Every conspiracy against Islam, every bit of 
scheming emanated from America and the task 
of terrorism was to strike terror against America, 
and not to be afraid of the “terrorism” label. Th is 
approach was what jihad was all about: jihad with the 
sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, and with 
the missile, jihad against God’s enemies [12]. 
Abdallah Azzam, the chief ideologue of al-Qa-
eda and an early spiritual mentor of Osama bin La-
den, used the same jihadi doctrine to radicalize and 
mobilize the Muslim world. For Azzam, jihad was a 
pivotal concept in a struggle against the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan, removal of apostate Muslim 
regimes and the establishment of an Islamic state. 
He considered jihad as imperative for the defense 
of the Muslims against the aggression of atheists. 
Azzam made clear that the jihad in Afghanistan was 
just a beginning: “Th is duty will not end with vic-
tory in Afghanistan; jihad will remain an individual 
obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are 
returned to us so that Islam will reign again: before 
us lie Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, 
Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, southern Yemen, 
Tashkent and Andalusia [20].
Th e main contemporary ideologue of global 
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jihad was Ayman al-Zawahiri who has become the 
leader of al-Qaida aft er Osama bin Laden’s death. In 
his book Knights under the Prophet’s Banner Za-
wahiri expressed his beliefs that the United States is 
removing Islam from power through rigged electi-
ons, brutality, and force. For Zawahiri, treaties, pe-
ace negotiations, and bans on weapons are steps in 
the direct occupation of Muslim land by American 
forces. Th us, jihad becomes an ideological struggle 
for survival, a war with no truce. “Th e battle today 
cannot be fought on a regional level without taking 
into account the global hostility towards us”, says Za-
wahiri, adding that the 11 September 2001 attacks 
were just an opening salvo against the Christian and 
Jewish infi dels. Now the very same jihadists, who 
made the fi ght against the near enemy a key opera-
tional priority, shift ed gears and called for a new “ji-
had” against the far enemy, particularly the United 
States and its Western allies. Th e road to Jerusalem 
no longer passed directly through Cairo, Algiers, 
Amman, or Riyadh but rather through a double-line 
highway, including stops in Washington, New York, 
Madrid, London, and other Western Capitals [19].
4. RADICAL DOCTRINE OF THE ISLAMIC 
STATE
ISIS draws on, and draws strength from, doctri-
nes that have broad resonance among jihadists. In 
addition to the growing attractiveness of teachings 
of Qutb and other Islamic thinkers, ISIS follows dis-
tinctive variety of Islam based on its defi nition of me-
ssianic ideology. Gerges writes that Baghdadi and his 
inner circle rely particularly on three Salafi -jihadist 
manifestos to rationalize and justify what they do: 
Th e Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr al-Najji, 
Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad by Abu 
Abdullah al-Muhajjer, and Th e Essentials of Making 
Ready [for Jihad] by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, aka Ab-
del-Qader Ibn Abdel-Aziz or Dr. Fadil. Despite diff e-
rences, there are common conceptual threads among 
the three manifestos that off er theoretical guidance 
for ISIS’s actions. First, the three books call for all-
out war and advocate off ensive jihad as opposed to 
defensive jihad in order to bleed the kuff ar (infi dels) 
or the enemies of Islam, thus creating chaos and fear. 
Second, although this total war should target both 
the near enemy and the far enemy, they prioritize the 
fi ght against tyrannical Muslim rulers who do not 
apply shariah (Qur’anic law). Finally, all three ma-
nifestos call on the movement’s planners and lieute-
nants to kill with impunity, to observe no limits and 
follow in the footsteps of the Prophet’s companions, 
who, in their opinion, brutally punished dissenters 
and rivals [21]. 
Th ese manifestos have become the ISIS’s blu-
eprints for jihad and establishment of a theocratic 
state. ISIS’s leaders have embraced these guidelines 
in every detail and incorporated them into their ide-
ology. In their viewpoint, violent jihad is presented as 
the only legitimate demonstration of true faith. Th e 
Islamic State emphasize this claim in the issues of its 
internet magazine Dabiq, claiming that Islam is a “re-
ligion of war not peace.” A Dabiq article picturesqu-
ely named By the Sword says: “Waging jihad – sprea-
ding the rule of Allah by the sword – is an obligation 
found in the Quran, the word of our Lord… Jihad is 
the ultimate show of one’s love for his Creator, facing 
the clashing of swords and buzzing of bullets on the 
battlefi eld, seeking to slaughter His enemies – whom 
he hates for Allah’s hatred of them” [22]. 
In the very center of ISIS’s ideology stands the 
preoccupation with the Apocalypse and the coming 
of a Messiah-like fi gure who will lead the Muslims 
to victory before the end of the world. ISIS’s foun-
ding fathers believe that the fi nal confrontation 
with the forces of unbelief is actually taking place 
before them. A hadith attributed to the Prophet Mu-
hammad about an end-of-days battle between Mu-
slims and Christians in Dabiq, a town in rural Alep-
po, is a frequent reference point—so pervasive that 
ISIS’s propaganda magazine is named for it [23]. It 
is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies 
of Rome will set up their camp. Th e armies of Islam 
will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome’s Waterloo 
or its Antietam [24]. Th e editors of Dabiq said they 
adopted the name for their magazine because: “Th e 
area will play a historical role in the battles leading 
up to the conquests of Constantinople, then Rome.” 
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Baghdadi and his associates depict themselves as 
battling the “antichrist” and paving the way for the 
ultimate triumph of the “Mahdi” and Islam (in Ara-
bic, the Mahdi means “the Guided One,” the central 
crowning element of all Islamic end-time narratives, 
or an expected spiritual and temporal ruler destined 
to establish a reign of righteousness throughout the 
world). Th is millenarian thinking is at the heart of 
ISIS’s caliphate ideology and the global jihadist mo-
vement in general [21]. 
Rapid territorial conquest in Iraq and Syria 
enabled ISIS to establish the fi rst jihadi Islamic sta-
te in the modern Muslim world. ISIS abolished the 
colonial borders between Iraq and Syria drawn by 
the European powers at the end of World War I and 
took control over the territory as large as the Uni-
ted Kingdom. Th ey declared that this physical and 
symbolic act of recombination was the end of a Bri-
tish-French colonial compact that had helped draw 
the map of the contemporary region even before 
the offi  cial terminus of World War I. Th ere would 
no longer be any Western fi ngerprint on that map, 
according to ISIS. Instead, there would only be the 
caliphate. Eventually, intoned ISIS’s leader, Abu Bakr 
al Baghdadi, if Muslims were strong, the caliphate 
would again reach Spain and even conquer Rome 
[23]. Baghdadi’s late June 2014 declaration of the 
caliphate in the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Iraqi’s 
second largest city Mosul was the fi rst such plausible 
claim since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. ISIS po-
litical agenda, however, is not bounded just to Iraq 
and Syria. It has a pattern for developing, consolida-
ting, and expanding the caliphate. ISIS’s core messa-
ge “remaining and expanding” implies the caliphate 
that encompasses territories from the Middle East to 
Central Asia, from North and parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa to Spain, and from the Balkans to Southeast 
Europe.
Its victories on the battlefi eld, territorial expan-
sion, apocalyptic discourse and proclamation of the 
caliphate helped the Islamic State to attract thousan-
ds of newcomers from around the world. Th ey all 
wished to travel to the lands where the fi nal battles 
of the apocalypse will take place and join a blood-
soaked proto-state based on a puritanical Medieval 
Islamic caliphate. Th e entire self-image and propa-
ganda narrative of ISIS is based on honoring and 
emulating Muhammad and the four “rightly guided 
caliphs” who led Muslims from Muhammad’s death 
and spread Islam to the Middle East and Africa. For 
the jihadists of ISIS, the Prophet and his companions 
are the models for all behavior, including politics, ju-
diciary, warfare, and culture. Th ey justify their acti-
ons on religious grounds by juxtaposing the distant 
past with the present and selectively citing verses 
from the Koran and the Sunna. Th eir commitment 
to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal 
environment characterized by excessive brutality 
echoes backward looking view of Islam when barba-
ric practices may have been appropriate for that time 
but not by today’s standards. Hence ISIS’s tendency 
for beheadings, stoning, crucifi xions and sex slavery. 
ISIS put Islam, Sharia and jihad at the center 
of the caliphate. It declared itself as protector of 
the Sunni ummah against a number of aggressive 
predators, including treacherous Sunnis, apostate 
Shias, Iran, the United States, and the West in ge-
neral. Its viciousness in particular aims at purifying 
the Muslim lands from perceived apostates and he-
retics, such as Yazidis, Kurds, Christians, and Shi-
as, as well as Sunnis who do not share their view. 
Baghdadi urged followers to prioritize violence aga-
inst Shiite Muslims and, aft er that, the Saudi royal 
family. Of the group’s enemies, he said: “Dismember 
them. Snatch them as groups and individuals” [25]. 
Baghdadi, like AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
before him, has a genocidal worldview, according 
to which Shias are viewed as infi dels, a fi ft h column 
in the heart of Islam who must either convert or be 
exterminated [21]. ISIS carnage has taken the lives 
of tens of thousands people in Iraq and Syria.
5. JIHAD AGAINST THE WEST
Th e fi rst jihadi message of the Islamic State was 
not the war against the West, but the near enemy. 
Jihad against the West was not placed high on the 
ISIS’s agenda. ISIS prioritized jihad against the Shia 
and apostate regimes of Iraq, Syria and their politi-
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cal and military sponsor Iran rather than planning 
attacks on the United States and Europe. AQI and 
ISIS view the struggle against America, Europe, 
and even Israel as a distant secondary goal that 
must be deferred until a Sunni Islamic state is bu-
ilt in the heart of Arabia and ISIS consolidates its 
grip on the Iraqi and Syrian territories it occupies 
[21]. Foreign military intervention against the ISIS, 
however, urged the group to change its agenda and 
make a strategic shift  by proclaiming jihad against 
the United States and its allies. 
A call for global jihad was declared on Sep-
tember 2014, just four months aft er the establis-
hment of the caliphate. In the fi rst release since the 
foundation of the Islamic State, ISIS spokesman 
Abu Mohammed al-Adnani called for “mujahidin 
in Europe, America, Australia, and Canada” and 
across the world to defend the Islamic state against 
the “dozens of nations ... gathered against it”. “If 
you can kill a disbelieving American or European 
– especially the spiteful and fi lthy French – or an 
Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever 
from the disbelievers waging war, including the ci-
tizens of the countries that entered into a coalition 
against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and 
kill him in any manner or way however it may be.” 
“Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek 
anyone’s verdict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is 
civilian or military, for they have the same ruling. 
Both of them are disbelievers,” said al-Adnani [26]. 
In May 2016, Adnani again called on followers to 
launch attacks on the United States and Europe 
during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. “Ra-
madan, the month of conquest and jihad. Get pre-
pared, be ready ... to make it a month of calamity 
everywhere for the non-believers ... especially for 
the fi ghters and supporters of the caliphate in Eu-
rope and America. Th e smallest action you do in 
their heartland is better and more enduring to us 
than what you would if you were with us. If one of 
you hoped to reach the Islamic State, we wish we 
were in your place to punish the Crusaders day and 
night,” Adnani said [27]. 
Th ose who are not able to join the caliphate are 
“blessed with the opportunity to serve a much grea-
ter purpose than dwelling among Muslims and wa-
ging jihad on the outer edges of the land of Islam. 
Indeed, you are behind enemy lines, able to strike 
them where it hurts them most”, states the seventh 
issue of Dabiq [27]. ISIS spokesman summarized 
ISIS’s global jihad by saying: “Our Quran require us 
to fi ght entire world, no exception. We will fi ght, and 
fi ght, and fi ght until the religion is entirely for Allah.” 
In September 2016, the Islamic State released 
the fi rst issue of a new magazine called Rumiyah, 
calling in it for terrorist attacks in the West. In a 
chapter Th e Kafi r’s Blood in Halal for You, So 
Shed It, ISIS called for terrorist attacks in the West: 
“Muslims currently living in Dar al-Kufr [land of 
disbelief] must be reminded that the blood of the 
disbelievers is halal [permissible], and killing them 
is a form of worship to Allah, the Lord, King, and 
God of mankind. Th is includes the businessman 
riding to work in a taxicab, the young adults (post-
pubescent “children”) engaged in sports activities 
in the park, and the old man waiting in line to buy 
a sandwich. Indeed, even the blood of the kafi r 
[unbeliever] street vendor selling fl owers to those 
passing by is halal to shed – and striking terror into 
the hearts of all disbelievers is a Muslim’s duty [28].
Meanwhile, ISIS leader himself issued a call to 
arms for fellow jihadists. Baghdadi exhorted Mu-
slims throughout the Middle East to rise up against 
“the agents of the Jews and crusaders, their slaves, 
tails and dogs.” He declared: “We see America and 
her allies stumbling between fear, weakness, ina-
bility and failure.” Belittling Washington’s plan to 
send more soldiers to Iraq, Baghdadi predicted 
that the Western powers would soon be forced to 
engage in ground combat with his fi ghters, who are 
concentrated mostly in eastern Syria and northwe-
stern Iraq: “O soldiers of the Islamic State, continue 
to harvest the soldiers. Erupt volcanoes of jihad 
everywhere” [28]. In Mosul, Baghdadi promised 
that the Islamic State will not stop its jihad until 
Rome is conquered. “By Allah’s permission, they 
[US-led coalition] will be defeated. And indeed the 
Muslims will be victorious. By Allah’s promise, they 
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will be victorious. And the march of the mujahidin 
will continue until they reach Rome.” 
In ISIS’s apocalyptic prophesy, hostile Rome 
is closely associated with the inimical West. Th e 
Prophetic narration that foretells the apocalyptic 
battle refers to the enemy as Rome. Now that Rome 
has no army, it might mean any infi del army. In 
ISIS narrative, however, Rome is synonymous not 
just with the Catholic Church but with the West in 
general. According to their mindset, the West is 
waging a new crusade against the Muslim world. 
It is the United States and its European allies who 
are targeting strikes on ISIS strongholds, providing 
military and fi nancial support to the regional an-
ti-terrorist campaign against ISIS, and sending 
combat troops on the ground to speed up the fi ght 
against jihadists. For ISIS, all that implies that the 
foreign intervention is fulfi llment of the ancient 
prophecy and a sign of the coming apocalypse. In 
the apocalyptic imagination of ISIS, foreign inter-
vention has been a sign of the coming apocalypse. 
Th e announcement in August 2014 of an internati-
onal coalition to fi ght ISIS in Syria was hailed as a 
sign that the Islamic prophecy was high, especially 
as it followed the declaration of a caliphate, another 
event foretold by the Prophet [23]. Th e conquest 
of Rome has become synonymous with defeat of 
the West. Th eological preoccupation with the near 
enemy gave way to fi xation on the far enemy. 
In an ISIS’s viewpoint of the world strictly di-
vided between “the caliphate on one side and the 
crusaders with their apostate agents on the other” 
[30], jihad against the dar al-Harb is a requirement. 
Strict division between two opposing camps 
allows ISIS to frame Western involvement in the 
confl ict in Iraq and Syria as a campaign “them ver-
sus us”, i.e. the West against Islam. Using a propa-
ganda mix of apocalypse, puritanism, sectarianism, 
ultraviolence and idyll of a caliphate, ISIS mobilizes 
supporters and inspires them to action. Th e rea-
sons for joining a global jihad can always be found. 
Most are associated with U.S. occupation of Iraq, 
participation in the anti-terrorist coalition, alleged 
prosecution of the Muslims in the West or bom-
bing attacks on ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. Th e 
Islamic State uses sustained airstrikes as evidence 
that Western countries are waging the war against 
Islam and portrays itself as the defender of Mu-
slims from the Crusaders led by the United States.
International intervention against ISIS and its 
military setbacks in Syria and Iraq urged the group 
to target the far enemy by relying on its remote affi  -
liates in Egypt and Libya and homegrown terrorists 
in Europe and North America. Since Adnani made 
the pronouncement, ISIS and lone wolf attackers 
inspired by the group have carried out a number 
of high-profi le terrorist attacks on Western targets. 
Th ose attacks have killed hundreds of people and 
injured thousands more. A list of terrorist attacks 
on Western countries includes Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the Uni-
ted States. According to a running count kept by 
CNN, the Islamic state and its affi  liates are respon-
sible for more than 140 terrorist attacks in 29 coun-
tries other than Iraq and Syria. 
Th e Islamic State has proved successful in trig-
gering individual terrorist operations by unaffi  lia-
ted sympathizers in Western countries. Substantial 
Muslim population in Western countries means 
there is a big pool of potential attackers on which 
ISIS could draw. Islamic extremism gained a foot-
hold among radicalized Muslim communities in a 
number of European countries. Its presence is par-
ticularly strong in Belgium, France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom, members of the European 
Union with the highest numbers of foreign fi ghters 
in Iraq and Syria per head of population. 
Th e majority of the attacks in Western coun-
tries have been masterminded by jihadists who 
were inspired by ISIS, rather than those who were 
actually members of the group. Th ose who carried 
out raft s of deadly attacks were mostly homegrown 
terrorist and lone wolf attackers inspired by the 
group. Th e proportion of outgoing fi ghters who 
return from the battlefi elds in Iraq and Syria and 
plot attacks against their home country or region is 
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relatively small. Th e work of Th omas Hegghammer 
and Petter Nesser found that 11 plotting returnees 
from an outgoing contingent of around 4,000 forei-
gn fi ghters in Syria makes for a blowback rate in the 
order of 1 in 360 [31]. 
While the proportion of terrorists who return 
from the foreign battlefi elds is not huge, those who 
do return are more experienced, eff ective and dan-
gerous operatives than nonveterans. Trained ISIS 
fi ghters were behind terror attacks at the Jewish Mu-
seum of Belgium in 2014, the 2015 Paris attacks and 
Brussels bombings in 2016. Th ey were drawn from 
camps in Syria run by ISIS and sent back in/to Euro-
pe. Th e returning veterans could also help propagate 
extremist ideas among other extremists. Th e role of 
these more experienced men, with the spurious cre-
dibility derived from seeing combat, as a vector for 
violent extremist ideologies has been demonstrated 
again and again over recent years [32].
ISIS’s strategy to expand its caliphate, instigate 
a sectarian war, and mount spectacular attacks on 
its enemies in the West played well into the group’s 
grand plan to drag the West into a fi nal apocalyp-
tic showdown in Dabiq. Jihadists celebrated madly 
when ISIS conquered this strategically unimpor-
tant town. When it lost Dabiq to Turkish-backed 
rebels in October 2016, ISIS suff ered mayor blow 
to its propaganda and apocalyptic perspecti-
ve. Further territorial loses further undermined 
its core message of remaining and expanding. 
However, ISIS’s leaders have found a way how to 
accommodate to a new realty and begun denying 
the importance of holding land in Iraq and Syria. 
Th ey have tried to off set territorial losses and 
shrinking of the caliphate by emphasizing ISIS 
operations in Asia, Africa and the West. As it loses 
ground in Iraq and Syria, the group will increasin-
gly attempt attacks on Western targets to create the 
perception that it is winning. In its Rumiyah issues, 
ISIS has been consecutively calling for terrorist 
attacks in the West. Th ese attacks against the far 
enemy divert attention from ISIS’s military losses 
in Syria and Iraq and also reinforce its narrative 
of invincibility and triumphalism [21]. Targeting 
the West with homegrown terrorists, the ISIS also 
wants to generate hostility between domestic Mu-
slim populations and the Western societies they 
live in by eliminating “the gray zone” representing 
coexistence between religious groups. It wants to 
create an “us versus them” war. Th e more violent 
and polarized a confl ict gets, the easier it is for ISIS 
to attract support from radicalized elements within 
Muslim societies. Using homegrown terrorist and 
jihadists for striking outside its immediate theater 
of operations, ISIS now appears more engaged in a 
truly global struggle. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Th e Islamic State has dramatically changed 
the landscape of terrorism. It has become the fi rst 
terrorist organization that annulled the formal sta-
te borders and established an Islamic proto-state 
with its own government, judiciary, police, and 
military, capable of waging both conventional and 
asymmetric warfare. ISIS managed to portray itself 
as a religiously legitimate actor among tens of tho-
usands of extremists from all around the world. 
Th ey all fl owed to the caliphate to become a part of 
ummah and wage a holy war in the name of Allah. 
By bringing together battle-hardened militants 
with newcomer jihadists, ISIS has become the most 
lethal terrorist organization in recent history. Dee-
ply committed to the Prophetic methodology, ISIS’s 
leaders and jihadists initiated total jihad against 
their opponents, regarding the slaughter of percei-
ved apostates and unbelievers as a divine comman-
dment to destroy their enemies.
Simultaneously using both constructive and 
destructive ideology, the Islamic State presented 
itself as a state builder and apocalyptic precursor. It 
used the preoccupation with the apocalypse as a ca-
talyzer for instigation of a sectarian war and off en-
sive jihad against the near and far enemy. Firmly 
believing in the end-of-days confrontation with the 
forces of unbelief, ISIS dedicates itself to annihilate 
the infi del enemy once for all no matter the costs. 
Its apocalyptic preoccupation, fanatical devotion to 
the caliphate and readiness for martyrdom made 
D. Kuntić
45
ISIS much more dangerous than other terrorist or-
ganization in the world. In a very short time period, 
the Islamic State managed to overshadow al-Qaeda, 
gained power and prestige among fellow extremists 
and positioned itself as the leader of global jihadist 
movement. 
International military intervention even more 
infl amed religious zeal among jihadists. In their 
apocalyptic imagination, it was a sign that the fi nal 
battle between good and evil has fi nally come. 
Many jihadists rushed to the caliphate to take 
part in the apocalypse while others understood that 
their divinely commanded duty was to confront the 
far enemy in its own backyard as a means to fulfi ll 
a centuries-old prophecy. Th ey all succumbed to 
ISIS’s propaganda of a glorious battle against the 
West. In a brief period of time, ISIS made a strategic 
shift  and called for jihad against the far enemy. Th e 
result was another jihadi blowback in Europe and 
North America. 
With territorial loses in Iraq and Syria, howe-
ver, the idea of the caliphate is dying. Continued 
military setbacks will lead to the physical end of the 
Islamic State. Th e caliphate will collapse and revert 
back to an idea again. However, it will not be the 
end of the group. ISIS will move to a new phase. It 
will likely withdraw in a shade and remain an in-
strument of destabilization. Aft er territorial loses, 
ISIS will try to sell its propaganda through terrorist 
attacks on domestic and foreign targets. Th e gro-
up will further exploit sectarian animosity and use 
local branches for domestic attacks. Abroad, ISIS 
will rely on homegrown extremists and returnees 
from the battlefi elds for major foreign terrorist ope-
rations. It will try to claim victory over the West 
by hitting it with lethal terrorist attacks, with the 
goal of gaining followers and assuming al-Qaeda’s 
mantle. Where its ideological appeal survives, the 
group will remain a major threat to international 
security. Th us, international antiterrorist coalition 
should remain focused on discretization of ISIS’s 
ideology and reducing (of) its appeal, not just its 
territorial control.
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ISLAMSKA DRŽAVA I GLOBALNI DŽIHAD
Sažetak
Cilj ovog rada je objasniti zašto je islamska država učinila strateški zaokret i pokrenula terorističku kampanju protiv Zapada. 
Glavna hipoteza tvrdi da napad na zemlje Zapada predstavlja protuudar zbog međunarodne intervencije protiv Islamske drža-
ve. Islamska država također vjeruje da će igrati ključnu ulogu u nadolazećoj apokalipsi. Njezine terorističke aktivnosti protiv 
Zapada uvelike proizlaze iz tog uvjerenja. Fokus ove studije je analiza religijskog terorizma kao projekcije nasilja usmjerenog k 
ostvarenju političkih ciljeva, ideoloških temelja militantnog Islamizma kao sustava ideja i uvjerenja koja potiču nasilne aktivno-
sti, doktrinu Islamske države kao kodifi kaciju njezinih uvjerenja i aktivnosti te globalnog terorizma kao oblika asimetričnog rata 
protiv zapadnih zemalja. Istraživanje je ustanovilo da je ISIS uspostavio proto-državu utemeljenu na salafi stičko-džihadističkoj 
doktrini, uspjevši se prikazati kao religijski legitimni akter među desecima tisuća ekstremista diljem svijeta. Duboko posvećeni 
metodoligiji poslanika Muhameda, čelnici i džihadisti Islamske države su pokrenuli totalni džihad protiv svojih protivnika, 
smatrajući zločine kao božansku zapovijed za uništenje njihovih neprijatelja. Grupa je iskoristila međunarodnu vojnu inter-
venciju kao znak nagovještene bitke protiv Zapada te pokrenula neselektivnu terorističku kampanju protiv zemalja Europe i 
Sjeverne Amerike. Uzevši u obzir teritorijalne gubitke u Iraku i Siriji, ISIS će se usredotočiti na terorističke napade u regiji i 
inozemstvu. Grupa će smrtonosnim terorističkim napadima pokušati pokazati da pobjeđuje Zapad, s ciljem pridobivanja novih 
sljedbenika i preuzimanjem uloge koju je na globalnoj terorističkoj sceni nekada imala al-Qaeda.  
Ključne riječi: Islamska država, apokalipsa, džihad, terorizam.
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